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Coveting thy Neighbour's Beer : Intergovernmental 
Agreements Dispute Settlement and Interprovincial 
Trade Barriers 
Didier CULAT* 
Récemment, les gouvernements provinciaux et fédéral du Canada ont 
négocié des ententes intergouvernementales afin de réduire les barrières 
au commerce interprovincial. Ces ententes contiennent un nouvel élé-
ment : un mécanisme de règlement des différends. Le mécanisme de rè-
glement des différends de /'Accord sur les pratiques de commercialisation 
de la bière s'inspire de celui de /'Accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et le 
commerce. Cette analyse comparative des mécanismes de règlement des 
différends recommande, en se basant sur l'expérience du modèle inter-
national, des améliorations au processus de /'Accord sur les pratiques de 
commercialisation de la bière afin d'assurer un règlement des différends 
efficace. 
Recent developments have led the governments of Canada to nego-
tiate intergovernmental agreements lowering interprovincial trade bar-
riers. Those agreements include a new element; a dispute settlement 
mechanism. The dispute settlement mechanism included in the recently 
concluded Beer Marketing Agreement was inspired by that found in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This article conducts a com-
parative analysis of these dispute settlement mechanisms and recom-
mends, on the basis of the international model's experience, refining the 
process in the Beer Marketing Agreement to ensure an effective dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
*B.A. (U.B.C.), L.L.B. (U.N.B.), L.L.B. (Laval), stagiaire, étude de Pothier, Begin, 
Québec. 
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On September 24th, 1991, the federal government tabled in the House 
of Commons its latest constitutional proposals. The wide ranging docu-
ment sought to address many concerns in Canada. Among those concerns 
were interprovincial trade barriers which impede the free flow of goods in 
Canada. The proposal brought forward called for an « Economic Union » 
which would reduce interprovincial trade barriers and expand the domestic 
Canadian economy1. 
However, this idea of reducing the interprovincial trade barriers is not 
a new concept. In 1987, at the Premiers Conference in Toronto, the 
Premiers of the Provinces agreed to negotiate a reduction in the trade 
barriers between their provinces2. In addition, in 1988, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, following a complaint by the European 
Economic Community, ruled3 that the preferential marketing practices4 of 
the provincial liquor commissions were in violation of the GATT. In 1989, 
the signing of the Canada—United States Free Trade Agreement created a 
situation where there would be less trade barriers between Canada and the 
United States than there exists between the Canadian provinces5. In re-
1. CANADA, Building Together Canada's Future : Proposals, Ottawa, Supply and Service 
Canada, 1991, p. 55. The proposed reforms to section 121 of the Constitution Act. 1867, 
30 & 31 Vict., (U.K.), c. 3 would : 1) widen the definition of the Canadian economic union 
to include the free flow of goods, people, capital, and services, independent of barriers 
based on territorial delimitations of provinces and territories ; and, 2) render illegal any 
law or practices which contravened the principle of the newly defined economic union. 
2. CANADA, Report of the Initiatives linked to the Public Sector Market, Annual First 
Ministers Conference, Toronto, Ontario, November 26 and 27, 1987. 
3. GATT, Canada-Importing, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Pro-
vincial Marketing Agencies, (1988) B.I.S.D. 35th Supp. 37. 
4. A form of interprovincial trade barriers, as we will see below. 
5. The provinces are not included in several chapters of the Free Trade Agreement, 
L.C. 1988, c. 65, such as Chapter 13 on Government Procurement or Chapter 17 on 
Financial Services. 
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sponse to these pressures and commitments, the provincial governments 
have negotiated intergovernmental agreements committing themselves to 
the reduction of interprovincial trade barriers. 
The negotiations for the elimination of interprovincial trade barriers 
has proceeded on a sectorial basis. Among the first sectors targeted were 
Beer Marketing Practices and Government Procurement. While some 
intergovernmental agreements concerning government procurement have 
been concluded on a regional basis6, the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Beer Marketing Practices has been ratified7 by all the provinces. 
These agreements on the abolishment of interprovincial trade barriers 
have included a dispute settlement mechanism. This is a new element in 
intergovernmental agreements. Previously, as in the Intergovernmental 
Agreements concerning the Canada Assistance Plan*, there were no dis-
pute settlement mechanisms. If a dispute arose between the parties, the 
parties were forced either to agree or to terminate the agreement. Now, 
with a dispute settlement mechanism, the parties foresee the long term 
duration of an intergovernmental agreement and the possibility that those 
commitments arising out of the intergovernmental agreement, with the 
passage of time, could change. 
This article will describe the dispute settlement process of the Beer 
Marketing Practices Agreement, compare it to the international model on 
which, we believe, it was based, and suggest modifications to the process 
based on the experience of the international model and the Canadian 
economic situation. 
1. Intergovernmental agreements 
Before proceeding any further, a preliminary concern must be ad-
dressed : What is the legal nature of an intergovernmental agreement ? This 
is a complex question to which there is no definitive answer. Given that it is 
a written document between two or more distinct parties which mutually 
engages those parties to rights and obligations, and that it is subject to the 
6. Agreements have only been concluded on a regional basis : Nova Scotia, Prince Edward 
Island, New Brunswick Memorandum of Agreement : Reduction of Interprovincial Trade 
Barriers ; Government Procurement, October 30, 1990 ; British Columbia, Alberta, Sas-
katchewan, Manitoba, Memorandum of Agreement : Western Agreement on Gover-
nement Procurement, March 6, 1989. 
7. Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices, (1991) 123 G.O. II, 2966. 
8. Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-l, s. 8 (2). 
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interpretative rules of contract law , it could be seen as a contract between 
governments. However, given that: 1) these distinct parties are govern-
ment entities concluding an agreement emanating from their sovereign 
jurisdictions ; and, 2) each government has been empowered to conclude 
the intergovernmental agreement by an Act of its own legislature, subject 
to the constitutional principle of the supremacy of parliament10 ; perhaps an 
intergovernmental agreement could be characterized as being subject to 
the international law of treaties. It would be our submission, given that 
intergovernmental agreements, as those to which we will be referring, were 
concluded between governments inside a federation, that intergovernmen-
tal agreements have a hybrid legal nature encompassing aspects of both the 
law of contracts and the international law of treaties. 
This hybrid legal nature creates the situation where some question 
whether an intergovernmental agreement is in fact an « agreement » ' ' since 
it can be unilaterally abrogated without recourse12. At best, it can be 
submitted that the legal nature of an intergovernmental agreement is akin to 
that of a «gentleman's agreement ». While the parties to the agreement 
agree to undertake certain obligations, there are no remedies available in 
the event of a breach of the agreement by one of the signatories. 
The second preliminary question would concern our study of the 
dispute settlement mechanism. While the intentions of the parties signing 
the intergovernmental agreement may be manifest from the face of the 
terms of the accord, it is our submission that the long term viability of the 
pact will only appear from the strength of the dispute settlement mecha-
nism. A loose dispute settlement mechanism will have little impact on 
disputes which arise from the non-implementation of the agreement's 
terms. Conversely, a strong and binding dispute settlement mechanism will 
9. Attorney General British Columbia v. Attorney General of Canada, (1889) 14 A.C. 295 
(P.C.) ; Re. Canada Assistance Plan, (1990) 46 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (CA.), rev'd, (1991), 
58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.), for other reasons ; State of South Australia v. Common-
wealth of Australia, (1962)A.L.R. 547 (H.C.); Re. Agreement between Canada and 
Alberta, (1983) 1 F.C. 567 (T.D.). For a further discussion of the legal nature of an 
intergovernmental agreement, refer to : A. LAJOIE, Contrats administratifs .-jalons pour 
une théorie, Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 1984, pp. 151-158. 
10. Whereby the legislature can legislate and repeal any law it wishes, just like any sovereign 
state, Re. Canada Assistance Plan, (1991) 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
11. K. WILTSHIRE, «Intergovernmental Agreements in Canada and Australia», (1980) 23 
Canadian Public Administration 353 ; K. WILTSHIRE, Planning and Federalism : Aus-
tralian and Canadian Experience, New York, University of Queensland Press, 1986, 
p. 150. 
12. I. BERNIER, N. ROY, C. PENTLAND et D. SOBERMAN, « The Concept of Economic Union 
in International Law and Constitutional Law », dans M. Kraswick (dir.), Perspectives on 
the Canadian Economic Union, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1986, p. 60. 
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act as a coercive force to fully implement the agreement in fears of a 
complaint which might force compliance with the terms of the accord. The 
choice is between an intergovernmental agreement which provides a feasi-
ble framework to achieve the ends identified and one which loosely speaks 
of grand objectives which are doomed to fail before the ink drys. 
While the current intergovernmental agreements are unenforceable, 
the inclusion of dispute settlement mechanisms into intergovernmental 
agreements may change their legal nature by granting the courts an avenue 
by which they may intervene to settle the dispute. By pushing the inter-
governmental agreement away from its unenforceable « gentleman's agree-
ment » aspect, towards a contractual basis subject to enforcement by the 
courts, the means by which governments interact may substantially be 
altered. 
2. Beer marketing agreement dispute settlement process 
Many goods produced in Canada are accorded a preferential treatment 
when they are sold in the province where they are produced. One of the 
best examples in Canada arises in the beer industry. The production and 
marketing of beer has been characterized13 as a provincial concern since all 
beer sold in one province is produced in that province. The provinces 
maintain this control, to the exclusion of the federal government's 91(2)14 
inter-provincial trade jurisdiction, by requiring that only beer produced in a 
province can be sold in that province15. This practice fosters the industry in 
13. Labatts Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914 in 
an obiter comment at 939. 
14. If these barriers were eliminated by way of intergovernmental agreement, the federal 
government would strengthen its control over the national economy as goods would flow 
freely between provinces and would be characterized as interprovincial trade and be 
subject to section 91(2) of the Constitution Act. 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., (U.K.), c. 3. 
15. The beer purchasing practices of the below listed provinces, favours the provinces 
producers by requiring a Brewer's License for the manufacturing of beer in the province. 
The Brewer's Licence permits the beer manufacturer to : 1) sell beer to a liquor commis-
sion ; and 2) sell beer directly to licensed premises : 
British Columbia Liquor Control and Licensing Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 237, 
s.57(2). 
Alberta Liquor Control Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-17, s. 29(1). 
Saskatchwan Liquor Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-18, s. 37. 
Manitoba Liquor Control Act, R.S.M. 1988, c. L-170. 
Ontario Liquor Control Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L-18, s. 3. 
Quebec Société des alcools du Québec, R.S.Q. 1989, c. S-13, s. 25 
New Brunswick Liquor Control Act, C.S.N.B. 1989, c. L-10, s. 113. 
Prince Edward Island Liquor Control Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. L-14, s. 11. 
Nova Scotia Liquor Control Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 260, s. 63. 
Newfoundland Liquor Control Act, S.N. 1979, c. 53, s. 2. 
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the province to the exclusion of the beer industry in other provinces. This is 
considered to be an interprovincial trade barrier16. 
The current round of negotiations for the elimination of such inter-
provincial trade barriers was conducted jointly among the provincial gov-
ernments and the federal government. The agreement aimed at allowing 
beer producers in one province to market their goods in other provinces 
without the structural blockages imposed by interprovincial trade barriers. 
On January 1, 1991, a final text on the Beer Marketing Practices was 
agreed upon. This ageement provides for the elimination of the preferential 
treatment accorded to the intra-provincial beer industry and includes a 
dispute settlement mechanism : 
Dispute Settlement 
11 (1) Any producer of Canadian beer or beer products, from a province 
that is party to this Agreement, that believes that another party is 
not conforming to this Agreement will inform his government 
which will seek a solution directly with the party against which the 
complaint has been made. 
(2) Any party to this Agreement, who believes that another party is not 
conforming to this Agreement will seek a solution directly with that 
party. 
(3) Failing a resolution of the issue, the parties involved will establish a 
panel of not more than three (3) neutral and qualified people accep-
table to these parties. 
(4) The Panel will make a determination of the case and report its 
findings to the parties involved. 
(5) If a party does not implement the Panel determination, the other 
party to the Agreement involved may suspend the application of 
For a further discussion of provincial discriminatory practices in the marketing of alco-
holic beverages see : I. BERNIER, « Le GATT et le problème du commerce d'état dans les 
pays à économie de marché : le cas des monopoles provinciaux des alcools au Canada », 
(1975) 13 Can. Y. B. Infi L. 98, 102-106. 
16. Complaints have been directed against Canada at the GATT concerning this practice in 
the beer industry. See GATT, Canada-Importing, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic 
Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, supra, note 3. Currently the United 
States is petitioning the GATT on a complaint concerning the Canadian marketing 
practices in the beer industry. 
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equivalent concessions made under this Agreement to the non-
complying party17. 
In short, the complaint of the industry would be subrogated to the 
industry's home province which would attempt to negotiate a settlement 
with the impugned province. Failing a negotiated settlement, the parties 
would establish a Panel charged with making a determination concerning 
the dispute. The determination would then be reported to the disputing 
provinces which would then obligate the province found in violation of its 
Beer Marketing Agreement obligations to implement the findings of the 
panel or suffer the loss of the equivalent concessions made under the 
Agreement by the other province in the dispute. 
It is the goal of the Canadian governments to set up a dispute set-
tlement process which is similar in nature to that of the GATT. The parties 
will benefit from a long consultation process and a gradual increase in 
pressure on the contravening party in hopes of reaching a negotiated 
settlement. However, the process will also be plagued by the shortcomings 
of the GATT process when trying to enforce a decision through retaliatory 
action. 
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
3.1 Dispute settlement process 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is an inter-
national trade arrangement in which Member States (called Contracting 
Parties) negotiate and implement uniform rules and procedures for the free 
flow of trade. The GATT has developed a dispute settlement mechanism 
which is based on political consultations and negotiations. The process 
facilitates the inter-communication of Member States of the GATT when 
one member complains of GATT agreement infringements by another 
Member State. This section of the paper will describe the GATT dispute 
settlement process, commencing with the internal complaint process and 
concluding with the adjudication procedure. Further, it will offer some 
critical comments on the GATT procedure and relate those comments to 
the dispute settlement procedure modeled on the GATT which is proposed 
in the Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices. 
The GATT dispute settlement process is a combination of internal law 
and international law. The process begins with a complaint by a person 
within a Member State. In Canada, while there are no formal complaint 
procedures, a person who complains that it was denied GATT benefits in 
17. Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices, supra, note 7, s. 11. 
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its foreign trade transactions with a Member State would complain to the 
Federal Minister of International Trade18. Individuals do not have standing 
before the GATT, only governments of Member States can petition the 
GATT to settle a dispute19. This lack of formalized process is to be com-
pared to the structured procedure which has been established in the United 
States. 
In the United States, a complaint is submitted to the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) who examines the complaint by virtue of the 
jurisdiction granted by section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended by 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act oflCßS20. The USTR then 
makes a determination, based on a consultation process with a cross-
section of the United States Federal Government21, whether to accept or 
reject the complaint. If the complaint is accepted, the process allows for 
150 days of consultation and negotiations in which the United States 
government and the government of the State against which the complaint is 
directed attempt to reach a negotiated settlement22. If no negotiated set-
tlement is achieved, the USTR then directs the complaint to the GATT 
process. We would submit that the internal complaint process in Canada, 
while not as formalized as that of the United States, would in effect follow a 
similar procedure. 
The GATT complaint process is governed by Article XXIII of the 
General Agreement23. This article provides that the complaining govern-
ment must show, to the impugned government, in writing, that an objective 
of the GATT Agreement is being nullified or impaired to its detriment24. 
This difficult onus of proof is lessened by the practice of presuming that, 
when there is a breach of a GATT obligation, it necessarily follows that 
there is a nullification or impairment of a GATT objective25. 
18. There are no regulations or laws which specify to whom the complaint must be directed. 
However, given that the negotiations and implementations of international trade agree-
ments (GATT, Free Trade Agreement) are the responsability of the International Trade 
Minister, it is safe to presume that he would be responsible for GATT complaints. 
19. J.-G. CASTEL, «The Uruguay Round and the Improvements to the GATT Dispute 
Settlement Rules and Procedures », (1989) 38 I.C.L.Q. 835. 
20. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. 2411. 
21. Determinations Regarding Petitions, 15 C.F.R., s. 2006.3 
22. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra, note 20, s. 303 (a) (2) (B) 
23. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (1969) B.I.S.D., art. XXIII (hereinafter: 
GATT) 
24. Id., art. XXIII. 1. 
25. J.C. BLISS, «GATT Dispute Settlement Reform in the Uruguay Round : Problems and 
Prospects », (1987) 23 Stan. J. Int'lL., 31 ; J.-G. CASTEL, loc. cit., note 19, 836. 
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The impugned government must give « sympathetic consideration to 
the representations or proposals made to it26 ». In common language this 
requires that the impugned government receive the representation of the 
complaining government and negotiate with that government in the hope 
that a settlement can be achieved. This would, under the United States 301 
procedure, correspond to the 150 days negotiating period27. 
Failing a negotiated settlement, the complaining government can 
make an application to the Council of GATT to appoint a Panel to adju-
dicate the dispute28. The request for a Panel, unless opposed by a Member 
State, will be granted according to the standard practice of the GATT29. 
The Panel will be made up of either three or five neutral international trade 
experts who are not objectionable to the Member States who are party to 
the dispute30. After consulting with the parties the GATT Council will then 
give the Panel its Terms of Reference which will be the basis of its inves-
tigation and its recommendations. Next, the Panel will conduct a «formal 
and adversarial31 » process where the complaining Member State and the 
impugned Member State make submissions explaining their relative posi-
tions. In addition, third parties, who feel that they have a « substantial 
interest » in the proceedings can be granted intervenor status and make a 
submission before the Panel32. The Panel will then make a finding and 
report its recommendations in writing to the GATT Council33. The Panel 
determination and reporting should take between three and nine months34. 
While the Panel is hearing the submissions and making its determina-
tion, the governments in dispute are invited to negotiate and attempt to 
achieve a settlement. Often a dispute will be settled to mutual satisfaction 
before the Panel has a chance to make its full determination35. 
26. GATT, supra, note 23, art. XXIII. 1. 
27. While normally speaking the GATT Consultation period would follow the 301 Complaint 
Consultation period, the 301 procedure was drafted in conformity with the GATT to 
include the GATT preliminary consultation period and insure that the complaint not only 
had a fixed period of consultations/negotiations, but also proceeded directly to a Panel. 
28. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveil-
lance, (1978-79) B.I.S.D. 26th Supp. 210, para. 10 (hereinafter: 1979 Understanding) 
29. J.-G. CASTEL, loc. cit., note 19, 836. 
30. R.E. HUDEC, « Reforming the GATT Adjudication Procedure : The Lessons of the DISC 
Case », (1988) 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1443. 
31. J.C. BLISS, loc. cit., note 25, 38. 
32. 1979 Understanding, supra, note 28, para. 15. 
33. Id., para. 16. 
34. Id., para. 20. 
35. J.-G. CASTEL, loc. cit., note 19, 837. 
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If the Panel's findings are adopted by the GATT Council, the Member 
State which is found in violation of its GATT obligations is under a duty to 
implement the recommendations within a reasonable period of time36. In 
the alternative, the Member State may use the Panel findings as the basis of 
a negotiated settlement with the complaining government37. If the Member 
State which is found in violation of its GATT obligations, fails to implement 
the recommendations within a reasonable period of time, the complaining 
government may request the GATT Council authorization to take re-
taliatory action against that Member State38. Retaliatory action has only 
been used once in the history of the GATT39. If the GATT obligations and 
concessions forming the uniform rules for the free flow of goods, enjoyed 
by a Member State are suspended, that Member State will be free to 
withdraw from the GATT40. 
The GATT panel dispute settlement model can be summarized as a 
consultation process which facilitates communication and negotiations 
between complaining Member States. As these negotiations are underway, 
the pressure on the Member States to settle the dispute is increased. The 
Panel in its adversarial process and findings assists the negotiating parties 
to crystalize the crux of the litigious issues. From this focused basis, the 
parties usually find common grounds on which to settle the dispute. The 
determination process of a GATT panel can further increase the pressure to 
settle the complaint as the parties in dispute can perhaps better achieve a 
compromise among themselves than be forced to accept an imposed set-
tlement from a third party. The panel determination is the basis of a finding 
from which the GATT proposes to settle the dispute. The ultimate sanction 
which can be imposed, against the recalcitrant Member State which does 
not implement a GATT finding, is a withdrawal of GATT benefits. 
3.2 GATT : Learning from experience 
The above described GATT dispute settlement model has undergone 
some reforms in the current Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations41. 
36. Id., 838. 
37. In the recent West Coast Salmon Fishing Dispute between Canada and the United States, 
Canada used the Panel findings of the GATT and the Free Trade Agreement as the basis of 
a negotiated settlement of the dispute in which the demands of the United States were 
addressed. 
38. GATT, supra, note 23, art. XXIII.2. 
39. J.-G. CASTEL, loc. cit., note 19, 838 ; J.-C. Buss, loc. cit., note 25, 38 ; Netherlands v. 
United States, (1955) B.I.S.D. 3rd Supp. 46. 
40. GATT, supra, note 23, art. XXIII.2. 
41. Ministerial Declaration, (1987) B.I.S.D. 33rd Supp. 19. 
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These reforms took effect on a trial basis May 1, 198942. The most sig-
nificant change has been the imposition of time limits for each step of the 
process. Where before there were no time limits and a dispute could, in an 
extreme case, take as long as 12 years to wend through the process43, now 
only 15 months would elapse between the request for consultations and the 
decision of the GATT Council to adopt a Panel's report44. In addition, 
arbitration was added as a possible alternative dispute settlement process 
to the traditional model45. 
Previous reforms had taken place within the GATT. The formal struc-
ture established by the GATT Agreement was streamlined by the actual 
practices of the dispute settlement mechanism. The following are examples 
of some of the reforms previously undertaken by the GATT. 
A first area of reform was the selection of panelists. The problem 
stemmed « not from finding international trade specialists » but from « find-
ing enough panelists of any kind, qualified, acceptable to the parties and 
within a reasonable period of time »46. This problem was further multiplied 
by the increase in GATT litigation47. This created delays in the appoint-
ment of panels48 and backlogged the settlement of the dispute. 
To overcome this difficulty, the GATT developed a list of available 
qualified panelists. The panelists would « preferably be governmental49 » 
and the «citizens of the countries who were in dispute would not be 
members of the panel50 » Further, the panelists would « sit in their indi-
vidual capacity and not as representatives of their government51 ». The 
panel would be nominated within 30 days of the complaint to the GATT 
Council52. In addition, once the panelists have been selected the govern-
ments in dispute would have 7 days to raise compelling reasons to oppose 
their nominations53. 
The GATT was very uncomfortable with its dispute settlement pro-
cess. This was due to the loose temporary structure of the GATT which 
42. J.-G. CASTEL, loc. cit., note 19, 844, citing the Ministerial Declaration of 1988 
MTN.TNC/7 (MIN), 9 December 1988, pp. 26-33. 
43. R.E. HUDEC, loc. cit., note 30, 1444. 
44. J.-G. CASTEL, loc. cit., note 19, 847. 
45. Id., 845. 
46. R.E. HUDEC, loc. cit., note 30, 1465. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. 1979 Understanding, supra, note 28, para. 13. 
50. Id., para. 11. 
51. Id., para. 14. 
52. Id., para. 11. 
53. Id., para. 11. 
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favoured a diplomatie resolution to the dispute rather than an adjudication 
by an international body54. There were fears that if the GATT became an 
international police force of tariffs and trade, the organization itself would 
be rejected and fail55. In response to those fears, the determinations of the 
panels, were according to Robert Hudec, for the first 30 years, not very 
helpful, imprecise and ultracautious56. 
As the role of the GATT increased and became more predominant, it 
became more legalistic in its panel findings57. This was in response to 
demands from Member States which wanted comprehensive, impartial and 
focused determinations by the Panels. A Panel finding which stated that 
there was a dispute between X and Y country and that they should nego-
tiate a resolution to the dispute was not very useful. Instead the « rise to 
legalism » brought panel determinations which were sufficiently compre-
hensive and detailed that they could actually be applied by the Member 
States as the basis of resolving the dispute58. 
While it seems that the GATT dispute settlement process has had its 
short comings, the fact that it has responded to these criticisms and re-
formed itself speaks to the flexible and adaptable nature of the organiza-
tion. With the regular scheduled Rounds of Negotiations, the GATT is able 
to address its problem areas and reform them. 
The GATT has institutionalized communication between the disputing 
parties. By forcing the governments to consult each other before pro-
ceeding to the formation of apanel, the GATT ensures that the parties start 
seeking a solution early in the dispute settlement process. Further, prior to 
the panel stage, the parties must agree in proceeding to the GATT dispute 
settlement process and in the selection of panelists. While the parties may 
have difficulties in resolving the actual dispute, the process is structured in 
such a way that they must continue to communicate with each other. In 
addition, during the panel submissions, the respective governments con-
tinue to communicate. While they may not be talking to each other, they 
are talking at each other and in this way are working towards a settlement. 
When the panel report is produced, the disputing parties have an objective 
third party which has attempted to encapsulate the dispute and propose a 
workable alternative solution. Here the report becomes the basis of more 
negotiations which ultimately resolve the dispute. 
54. R.E. HUDEC, loc. cit., note 30, 1469. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Id., 1470. 
57. Id., 1471. 
58. Id., 1472. 
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In addition to facilitating communication, the GATT dispute set-
tlement dynamics increases the pressure on the disputing Member States to 
resolve the impass. It would be an oversight to disregard the potential 
power of a panel finding which has been adopted by the GATT Council. If 
a negotiated settlement is not forthcoming, the Member State which is 
found in violation of its GATT obligations will be forced to implement the 
panel findings. The implementation of a third party's determination may 
not best address the particular situation of the states in dispute. As such the 
findings, or the potential threat of findings, are sources of pressure on the 
disputing parties to negotiate a settlement which is based on a mutual 
compromise. Hence pressure to negotiate a settlement between Member 
States increases as the dispute settlement process progresses. 
Since the GATT dispute settlement model is keyed on negotiations, it 
forces governments to approach the dispute with a flexible perspective. 
While there will be the traditional pre-negotiating posturing and the post-
negotiation claims of victory, the actual negotiations are a mutual give and 
take, the result of which is generally acceptable to both parties59. In this 
way there is an inter-linkage of issues which are discussed and settled in the 
search for a mutual compromise. Hence the Member State with the most 
economic levers runs the lesser risk in a GATT dispute settlement negotia-
tions as the impact of one concession will be minuscule compaired to the 
relative cost which would be imposed on the smaller undiversified econ-
omy of another Member State. 
3.3 Learning from the GATT in Canada 
These criticisms and advantages of the GATT must be compared to the 
structure in the Beer Marketing Agreement which has adopted a similar 
dispute settlement process60. 
When a dispute arises, the disputing parties must mutually agree not 
only to form a panel, but also to appoint three acceptable panelists. Given 
the problems encountered by the GATT in the selection of panelists, 
perhaps the governments which are parties to the agreement should estab-
lish a list of qualified, acceptable, and available candidates. Without this 
type of information the formation of a Panel will be delayed as the parties 
attempting to resolve the dispute are searching for panelists. 
The Panel's mandate in making a determination is unclear. Is it to 
make a simple determination stating that a party to the agreement is in 
violation of the agreement ? Or is it to suggest, comprehensively a way of 
59. J. CARTER, «Principles of Negotiation », (1986) 23 Stan. J. oflnt'lL. 1. 
60. See section on the Beer Marketing Agreement, supra, s. 2. 
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remedying the violation of the agreement ? As seen with the GATT, the 
dispute settlement process went from imprecise determinations of viola-
tions to a legalistic analysis which formed the basis of a negotiated agree-
ment between the Member States. Perhaps the mandate of the Panel should 
be clarified. 
The proposal is silent concerning the time periods for each stage of the 
process. How long should the provinces consult among themselves before 
proceeding to the formation of a Panel ? How long does the Panel have to 
make its findings ? No guidance can be found in the Agreement to answer 
these questions. This could lead to protracted dispute settlement as was 
found by the GATT in the DISC case61. 
There are no alternative dispute settlement procedures available to the 
parties of the Agreement. At the GATT, the parties can either submit 
themselves to the Panel or opt for arbitration. This option is not available in 
the Agreement. 
However, by adopting the GATT dispute settlement model the Beer 
Marketing Agreement will benefit from a flexible process which encour-
ages communication between governments which are party to the agree-
ment. This communication will facilitate negotiations and, it is hoped, will 
settle the dispute. 
How well would the GATT dispute settlement model operate within 
Canada ? The principal question concerns the ability of provinces to nego-
tiate. 
As previously discussed the pressure to negotiate at the GATT is the 
fear of being imposed a settlement to the dispute by a third party. This acts 
as a stimulus to negotiate as the Member States would usually prefer to 
settle the dispute by a mutual compromise rather than be forced to imple-
ment a GATT finding. Finally, the imposition of retaliatory action by the 
Member States acts as the highest form of pressure to negotiate. How well 
will this be transplanted in Canada ? How effective will this be considering 
that the agreement only covers one industry (beer) while the GATT covers 
trade in general ? 
Can the GATT dispute settlement process transplanted into the Ca-
nadian economic context act as a pressure on the provinces to negotiate 
with each other. Hypothetically, if New Brunswick complains about the 
beer marketing practices of the Province of Quebec, what can New Bruns-
wick offer in the negotiations to settle the dispute ? If the dispute is 
unresolved and proceeds to a withdrawal of New Brunswick benefits to 
61. R.E. HUDEC, loc. cit., note 30. 
D. CULAT Trade Barriers 631 
Quebec manufacturers, will this make much difference to Quebec which 
could be described as the second largest market in Canada ? Further, will 
the withdrawal of benefits make any difference since the manufacturers of 
beer in Quebec are the same companies as the manufacturers of beer in 
Ontario against which New Brunswick has not withdrawn its benefits ? 
One has to wonder how effective the GATT type dispute settlement mech-
anism will operate given the economic disparities in Canada and the dy-
namics of imposing a dispute settlement mechanism over one industry 
which is dominated by two or three companies. At best, the inclusion of the 
GATT dispute settlement process will stimulate some negotiations and 
perhaps be the basis of a political settlement of the trade dispute. 
4. Arbitration 
It appears that the Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing 
Practices, while being inspired by the GATT dispute settlement process, 
has sought to settle disputes by arbitration. The similarities drawn from the 
GATT are the subrogation by the provincial governments of the producer's 
claim62, the consultation process before the formation of a panel63, and the 
suspension of equivalent concessions in the event of non-compliance with 
the panel's findings64. However it could be submitted that the panel deter-
mination process is a departure from the existing GATT model and adopts 
an arbitration procedure. Black's Law Dictionary defines arbitration as : 
The reference of a dispute to an impartial (third) person chosen by the parties to 
the dispute who agree in advance to abide by the arbitrator's award issued after a 
hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard65. 
If we analyse this definition against the actual text of the Agreement 
we see : 
(3) Failing a resolution of the issue, the parties involved will establish a 
panel of not more than three (3) neutral and qualified people accept-
able to these parties. 
(4) The Panel will make a determination of the case and report its findings 
to the parties involved. 
(5) If a party does not implement the Panel determination66... 
62. Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices, supra, note 7, s. 11(1); 
J.-G. CASTEL, loc. cit., note 19, 836. 
63. Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices, supra, note 7, s. 11(2); 
GATT, supra, note 23, art. XXIII. 1. 
64. Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices, supra, note 7, s. 11(5) in 
fine ; GATT, supra, note 23, art. XXIII.2. 
65. H.C. BLACK, Black's Law Dictionnary, 5e éd. St-Paul, West Pub, 1979. 
66. Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices, supra, note 7, s. ll(3)-(5). 
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We thus see a modification from the GATT model : where in the GATT 
the parties must petition the GATT Council for the formation of a Panel67, 
the Agreement specifies that the parties in dispute will decide the formation 
of the Panel themselves68 ; where at the GATT, the Panel reports its 
findings to the GATT Council69, in the Agreement the Panel reports di-
rectly to the parties in dispute70. On the face of it these modifications would 
not in themselves lead to defining the process as arbitration. However, the 
executory nature of the Panel's determination71 appears to fall into the 
above definition requiring that the parties « agree in advance to abide by the 
arbitrator's award72 ». When the executory nature of the Panel's determi-
nation is combined with the above modifications it forms a convincing 
argument that the intent of the Agreement is to proceed by arbitration. 
If in fact the dispute settlement process in the Agreement is arbi-
tration, it is perhaps possible to have the Panel's determination (arbitral 
award) adopted by the superior court of the province party to the dispute. 
The effect of the adoption is to transform the arbitral award into a judgment 
of the court. Such a judgment is a key element in forcing the government to 
act as « The government will not ignore a decision of the court73 » and « It is 
the duty of the Crown and of every branch of the Executive to abide by and 
obey the law74 ». 
However, the problem remains in the adoption of the arbitral award in 
another jurisdiction. Once the arbitral award has been adopted by the 
superior court of the complaining province75 it may not be recognized by 
the impugned province's superior court. This problem could be resolved 
according to principles of conflicts of laws. In the recent Supreme Court of 
Canada judgment of De Savoye v. Morguard Investments16, it was found 
that a final judgment in one province should not be treated as a foreign 
judgment in another province's court, given the federal structure of the 
Canadian constitution77. Moreover, this adoption of the arbitral award 
67. 1979 Understanding, supra, note 28, para. 10. 
68. Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices, supra, note 7, s. 11(3). 
69. 1979 Understanding, supra, note 28, para. 16. 
70. Intergovernmental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices, supra, note 7, s. 11(4). 
71. Id.,s. 11(5). 
72. H.C. BLACK, op. cit., note 65. 
73. Prince Edward Island v. Canada, (1978) 1 F.C. 533 (A.D.), 559. 
74. Eastern Trust Company v. McKenzie, Mann and Co. Ltd., (1915) A.C. 750 (P.C.), 759. 
75. Who would of course have a vested interest in having a determination against the 
impugned province executed. 
76. De Savoye v. Morguard Investments Ltd., (1990) 52 B.C.L.R. (2d) 160 (S.C.C.), 180. 
77. This general statement of the court was subject to the condition that the court rendering 
the original judgment had correctly and conveniently exercised its jurisdiction De Savoye 
v. Morguard Investments Ltd., supra, note 76, 181. 
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could be further facilitated by the use of either the Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Judgements Act or the United Nations Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration. 
The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act7S is not a viable alter-
native since the Act does not apply to judgments against the Crown and 
because Quebec does not have a reciprocal enforcement of judgments 
agreement with the other jurisdictions in Canada. 
The International Commercial Arbitration Acts, which adopt the 
United Nations Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration are 
found in every Canadian jurisdiction79 and are also problematic. Such Acts, 
in all Canadian jurisdictions save Quebec, limit the jurisdiction for judi-
cial adoption to disputes stemming from « commercial legal relationships, 
whether in contract or not ». The arbitration provisions of the Quebec Code 
78. British Columbia 
Alberta 
Saskatchewan 
Manitoba 
Ontario 
New Brunswick 
Prince Edward Island 
Nova Scotia 
Newfoundland 
79. British Columbia 
Alberta 
Saskatchewan 
Manitoba 
Ontario 
Quebec 
New Brunswick 
Prince Edward Island 
Nova Scotia 
Newfoundland 
Yukon Territory 
Northwest Territory 
Canada 
Court order Enforcement Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 75, ss. 30-41. 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R. S. A. 1980, c. R-6. 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R. S. S. 1978, c. R-3. 
Reciprocal Enforcement oj'Judgments Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. J-20 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgements Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. R.5. 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, 
c. R-3. 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, 
c. R-6. 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.S. 1986, 
c. 388. 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.F. 1970, 
c. 327. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.B.C. 1986, c. 14. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.A. 1986, c. I-6.6. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.S. 1988-89, 
c. 10.2. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.M. ' 1988, 
c. L-151. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.O. 1988, c. 30. 
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 1989, c. C-25, ss. 940-952. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N.B. 1986, 
c. I-12.2. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1989, 
c. 1-5. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, 
c. 234. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N. 1986, c. 45. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 70. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N.W.T. 1986, c. 6. 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985 
(2nd Supp.), c. 17. 
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of Civil Procedure80 place no limitations concerning the subject matter of 
an arbital sentence. A dispute arising from the Intergovernmental Agree-
ment on Beer Marketing Practices would be at its root commercial since 
the process is commenced by a complaint from a beer producer who is 
denied access to a market. However, given that the producer's complaint is 
subrogated by the provincial government, the argument could be main-
tained that the commercial aspect of the dispute has been put aside in 
favour of political dispute weakening the commercial aspect to the point of 
denying the courts the jurisdiction to adopt the arbitral sentence. 
The « commercial legal relationship » limitation of the International 
Commercial Arbitration Acts, can be avoided by the utilization of the 
Arbitration Acts81 which similarly provides for the adoption of arbitral 
sentences on application to a superior court, but without any set limita-
tions. However, this may not prove to be an adequate approach since the 
Crown is not uniformly bound by the Arbitration Acts82. This must be 
compared with the International Commercial Arbitration Act which binds 
the Crown in all Canadian jurisdictions83. 
80. Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 1989, c. C-25, ss. 940-952. 
81. British Columbia Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 18. 
Alberta Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. A-43. 
Saskatchewan Arbitration Act, R.S.S. 1980, c. A-24. 
Manitoba Arbitration Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. A-120. 
Ontario Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A-24. 
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 1989, c. C-25, ss. 940-952. 
New Brunswick Arbitration Act, C.S.N.B. 1987, c. A-10. 
Prince Edward Island Arbitration Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. A-16. 
Nova Scotia Arbitration Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 19. 
Newfoundland Arbitration Act, S.N. 1985, c. 8. 
82. Each jurisdiction's Arbitration Acts set out the Crowns status : 
Crown is bound Crown is conditionnally bound Crown is not bound 
Quebec Nova Scotia Newfoundland 
Ontario New Brunswick Saskatchewan 
Manitoba Prince Edward Island Alberta 
Brisith Columbia* 
* British Columbia's Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 206, s. 14(1), reverses the 
Common Law presumption that grants the Crown immunity in the absence of the 
legislation explicitly binding the Crown. 
83. British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.B.C. 1986, c. 14. 
Alberta International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.A. 1986, c. 1-6.6, 
s. 11. 
Saskatchewan International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.S. 1988-89, 
c. 10.2, s. 10(1). 
Manitoba International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.M. 1988, 
c. L-151, s. 11(1). 
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To enforce a panel's determination stemming from the Intergovern-
mental Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices through arbitration will 
require either uniform amendments to either the Arbitration Acts in order 
that the Crown be bound in all jurisdictions, or to the International Com-
mercial Arbitration Acts to expand the jurisdiction beyond matters chara-
terized as « commercial legal relationships ». 
Conclusion 
The dispute settlement mechanism found in the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Beer Marketing Practices, since it is partially inspired from 
the GATT, should seek to learn from the GATT's experience and incor-
porate those reforms84. While there are those who would be hesitant to re-
open the negotiations of the Agreement, a procedural clarification of the 
dispute settlement mechanism could be contained in a protocole of under-
standing annexed to the Agreement. 
Such a protocole would incorporate the obligation on the parties to the 
Agreement to establish a criteria of selection and a list of acceptable 
panelists who could be drawn upon to constitute a panel. The criteria would 
establish the preferable attributes of candidates placed on the list of accept-
able panelists. Such a list would facilitate the formation of the Panel as the 
parties would have agreed in advance, to the Panelist charged with making 
a determination concerning the dispute. 
Ontario International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.O. 1988, c.30, 
s. 12. 
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 1989, c. C-25, s. 94. 
New Brunswick International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N.B. 1986, 
c. 1-12.2, s. 11. 
Prince Edward Island International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1989, 
c. 1-5, s. 11(1). 
Nova Scotia International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, 
c. 234, s. 12(1). 
Newfoundland International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N. 1986, 
c. 45, s. 12. 
Yukon Territory International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 70. 
Northwest Territory International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N. W.T. 1986, c. 6, 
s. 11(1). 
Canada International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985 
(2nd Supp.), c. 17, s. 10. 
84. A contrary opinion is expressed by Robert Hudec in bis recent book concerning the 
GATT. He suggest's that a strong commitment to a trade agreement with a flexable 
conflict resolution approach and not rigourous procedures in a dispute settlement mech-
anism are the keys to a successful implementation of the trade agreement, R.E. HUDEC, 
The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, 2e éd., Salem, Butterworth Legal 
Publications, 1990, p. 296. 
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In addition, the protocole would clarify the mandate of the Panel. In 
the present text of the Agreement, it is unclear whether the Panel is to 
simply accuse a party of having violated the Agreement or if the Panel is 
mandated to comprehensively analyse the violations of the Agreement and 
to suggest possible alternatives which could rectify the situation. While the 
parties are free to choose the role which they want the panel to adopt, a 
comprehensive approach would stimulate a greater understanding of the 
economic and industrial dynamics involved and lead to long term recom-
mendations rather than short term stop-gap measures. 
Finally the protocole would establish a time table setting out maximum 
time delays for the different steps of the dispute settlement mechanism. 
One possibility would be to give the parties 30 days to negotiate a set-
tlement, failing which the parties would proceed to a panel which would be 
formed within 7 days. The Panel would then have 90 days to conduct their 
hearings and report their determination to the parties in dispute. The 
impugned party would then benefit from 60 days to implement the panel's 
determination. The whole process would take 6 months. These forced 
delays would act as a form of pressure on the parties to negotiate a 
settlement. 
Aside from the shortcomings of the dispute settlement process which 
can be addressed through a protocole, the larger question concerning the 
efficacy of the GATT dispute settlement process within the Canadian 
context needs to be addressed. We are sceptical with regard to the impact 
that the dispute settlement process can have when it is applied only to the 
beer industry which is dominated by two or three major players which 
operate in most provinces of Canada. The withdrawal of equivalent con-
cessions between two disputing provinces will have no impact on the beer 
industry which operates in a third province and can have unobstructed 
access to the disputing provinces via that third province. 
To overcome this limited impact, the Beer Marketing Practices 
Agreement could be incorporated into a larger multi-sectorial agreement. 
A multi-sectorial agreement would reduce the trade barriers over a wide 
range of goods and industries. This would end the two company domina-
tion found in the beer industry. Moreover, this would permit the linkage 
of issues in the dispute settlement process creating a greater area for 
manoeuvre in the negotiations. 
The multi-sectorial agreement could possibly entail a gradual transfer 
of provincial regulatory powers to the federal government. The removal of 
trade barriers between the provinces, would perhaps force some industries 
to restructure themselves from a provincial structure to regional/inter-
provincial structures. A classic example would be the beer industry. Cur-
D . CULAT Trade Barriers 637 
rently, as discussed above, the beer sold in one province is, because of a 
trade barrier, brewed in that province. When the trade barriers are re-
moved, the beer industry will more than likely restructure itself from 
provincial brewers to regional brewers serving several provinces' needs 
from one brewery. Chances are, that an aspect of this will involve trade 
over provincial boundaries, and that aspect will consequently fall under the 
federal government's 91(2) interprovincial trade jurisdiction85. This poten-
tial loss of provincial power is confirmed by both Privy Council86 and 
Supreme Court of Canada87 decisions stating, in the interpretation of 
section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, that extra-provincial trade was 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal government since the provincial 
jurisdiction was limited to the regulation of local matters. This is not to say 
that the provinces will lose their regulatory jurisdiction concerning the sale 
of beer within the province but rather that the federal government, within 
its existing regulatory jurisdiction concerning inter-provincial trade, will 
play an augmented role in the beer industry. The provinces will thus have 
been stripped of an aspect of its regulatory jurisdiction, to the benefit of the 
federal government. This is an undeniable aspect of the reduction of 
interprovincial trade barriers. However the significant difference between 
a sectorial agreement limited to an industry and a multi-sectorial agree-
ment, is that while both agreements involve a transfer of an aspect of 
provincial regulatory powers, the sectorial agreement does so on a piece-
meal basis, leaving the remainder of the provincial regulatory jurisdiction 
unaddressed by the agreement, intact for the provincial governments. This 
must be compared to the multi-sectorial agreement which would have the 
indirect effect, given the expansiveness of such an agreement, and the 
importance of the industries involved, of a larger transfer of provincial 
regulatory powers. 
As an alternative to the multi-sectorial agreement, the Beer Marketing 
Practices Agreement could be substantially strengthened in its impact by 
drawing on the arbitration aspect of its procedure. As stated earlier, it is our 
submission that the procedure could be characterized as arbitration. If in 
fact this is an arbitration process, the arbitral award could be adopted by 
the courts as a judgment if the laws of all the provinces party to the 
Agreement were uniform. The International Commercial Arbitration Acts 
could be amended to re-define the court's jurisdiction to adopt an arbitral 
85. The federal government would strengthen its control over an aspect of the national 
economy as goods and services would flow freely between provinces and would be 
characterized as interprovincial trade and be subject to section 91(2) of the Constitution 
Act. 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., (U.K.), c. 3. 
86. Citizens Insurance v. Parsons, (1881) 7 A.C. 96 (P.C.). 
87. Dominion Stores v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 844. 
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award beyond the current limitation of « commercial legal relationship ». In 
the alternative, the Arbitration Acts of those provinces which do not bind 
the Crown could be amended so as to find the Crown bound, and a arbitral 
award could be adopted against the government. 
In the final analysis we must ask ourselves, « Do we want this dispute 
settlement process to work? ». If the answer is yes, the bold first step of 
establishing a dispute settlement process in the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Beer Marking Practices may be « much ado about nothing » 
if the process is not refined beyond its current form. This important first 
step requires some fine tuning which may make the Agreement a powerful 
initiative in re-defineing the economic order in Canada. 
